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INTRODUCTION

Several recent developments in U.S. tobacco litigation-large jury verdicts
against tobacco companies from a pool of approximately 8,000 individual
plaintiffs in FloridaI and potentially significant economic loss class actions based
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See Brief of Appellees at 11, Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324 (11th

Cir. 2010) (No. 08-16158), 2009 WL 2816556. But see Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 576
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on the alleqedly fraudulent sale of light cigarettes pending in a number of
jurisdictions -might lead observers to believe that claims based on tobacco use
are a growing area of tort law with an increasingly promising future for injured
claimants. This Article argues that quite the opposite is true. To be sure, when
plaintiffs first brought tort claims against tobacco companies approximately fifty
years ago,3 a reasonably prescient observer might have anticipated that tobacco
plaintiffs would enjoy increasing success over time. Surely high-risk and deadly
products like tobacco4 would support a steady stream and eventually a flood of
significant recoveries in an American system of strict products liability, which
was undergoing rapid, pro-plaintiff expansion. For all one might have foreseen
fifty years ago, the tobacco companies' days were numbered. And yet, with only
a relatively few exceptions, this has not occurred. Historically, plaintiffs have
faced a lack of success as courts rejected their theories of recovery as a matter of
law.6 This Article briefly summarizes the history of tobacco tort litigation to

F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1334 & n.I1 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (noting that "approximately 4,000 former Engle
class members filed suit" in state court and that "[d]efendants . .. removed virtually all of [the] state
court actions" to federal court (emphasis added)), vacated, 611 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2010). See
infra notes 139-54 and accompanying text.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 154-66.
3. In 1954, Ira C. Lowe filed the first case against a tobacco company. Robert L. Rabin, A
Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REv. 853, 857 (1992) (citing Lowe

v. R.I Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 9673(1) (E.D. Mo. filed Mar. 10, 1954)). The plaintiff dismissed
the defendants only three months after filing his action, see Lowe, No. 9673(3), but then refiled the
case one month later. Lowe v. R.I Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 9871(3) (E.D. Mo. filed July 6,
1954). Ultimately, however, the court dismissed the action. Id. Furthermore, even though Lowe's
daughter subsequently filed an action to collect damages for loss of a parent, she too dismissed her
action against the defendants. Lowe v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 10,318(2) (E.D. Mo. filed
June 24, 1955). Throughout the 1950s, 100-150 filings from the first wave of tobacco litigation
were also dropped. Rabin, supra (citing "estimate ... from a defense lawyer who was intimately
involved in the first wave of litigation" and who asked to remain anonymous). See also Marcia L.
Stein, Cigarette ProductsLiability Law in Transition, 54 TENN. L. REv. 631, 631-38 (1987), for a

discussion of early tobacco litigation.
4.
See Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Years of Potential Life Lost, and Productivity
Losses-United States, 2000-2004, 57 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1226, 1226-27

(2008) ("[D]uring 2000-2004, cigarette smoking and exposure to tobacco smoke resulted in at least
443,000 premature deaths."). Although this data was not available fifty years ago, it was common
knowledge that tobacco use was harmful to health. See Rabin, supra note 3, at 856.
5.
See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in
ProductsLiability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479, 483-88 (1990)

(outlining judicial decisions in representative products liability cases from the mid-1960s to the
mid-1980s).
6. Plaintiffs have lost failure-to-warn cases because the danger of cigarette smoking is a
matter of common knowledge, see Allgood v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 80 F.3d 168, 172 (5th
Cir. 1996), and because a company's warnings complied with The Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act, see Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 235 (6th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiffs have lost design cases on the grounds that tobacco is not a defective or unreasonably
dangerous product as a matter of law, see Adams v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. 931571-CIV-J-20, 1995 WL 17019989, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 1995) (citing Roysdon, 849 F.2d at
236; Green v. Am. Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97, 106 (5th Cir. 1968), overruled by 409 F.2d 1166,
1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc) (per curiam); Paugh v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 834 F. Supp.
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date, describing its major phases, and explains why things have, on the whole,
been disappointing for plaintiffs. We conclude that tobacco litigation, as a
significant subset of American tort litigation, is reaching an equilibrium; it
should not require more than fifteen or twenty years for tobacco litigation to
arrive at the point where a relatively small but steady stream of claims produces
a trickle of plaintiffs' recoveries.
We should be careful not to overstate plaintiffs' declining success. In the
short run-over the next five or so years-the tobacco industry's exposure to
civil liability may actually increase. The recent developments noted at the
outset,7 while not likely to lead to a long-term resurgence, may combine to allow
tobacco plaintiffs, in the short term, to do better than they have done historically.
By 2020 or so, however, with choice-based defenses steadily strengthening and
new claim filings trending down,8 it will be obvious that an equilibrium has
arrived. By its seventy-fifth anniversary, in 2030, tobacco litigation as a
significant, potentially explosive subset of tort will be history. Other areas of socalled mass tort may continue to flourish based on what we refer to as the
asbestos litigation claims model. But as this Article will show, the asbestos
model is very different from the tobacco model in ways that explain why the
former will support episodes of mass tort while the latter will not.9 Recent
empirical data on trends in filings, claims pending, and plaintiffs' success at trial
support our conclusion that tobacco litigation's days as a significant subset of
American tort litigation are over.10
Before concluding our analysis of the future of American tobacco litigation,
we will consider whether tort litigation against American tobacco companies
may be on the verge of expanding in foreign jurisdictions." Even if tobacco
litigation is reaching equilibrium in this country, might not a more pro-plaintiff
tort litigation cycle against American tobacco companies be about to commence
abroad? For reasons developed later in this Article, we doubt that such events
will occur.12 Tobacco-based tort claims face no brighter future elsewhere than
they face in our own courts.

228, 232 (N.D. Ohio 1993)); Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 85-4294, 1990 WL
10008088, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 1990) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A cmt. i

(1965)), or because plaintiffs have been unable to establish a reasonable alternative design, see
Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 852 F. Supp. 8, 9-10 (E.D. La. 1994) (citing LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2800.56 (2009)), aff'd, 52 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995).
7. See supranotes 1-2 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 99-14.
10. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 181-186.
12. Id.
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A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THREE PHASES OF TOBACCO LITIGATION

A.

A BriefOverview of the FirstTwo Phases (Mid-1950s to Mid-1990s)

Professor Robert Rabin has chronicled the history of American tobacco
litigation in a series of perceptive academic essays published over the past two
decades.13 Rabin describes three distinct "waves" of litigation, with the third
wave carrying up to the present. 14 We speak of "phases" rather than "waves,"
but clearly we take our inspiration from Rabin. The initial phase of tobacco
litigation, which commenced in the mid-1950s and covered the decade of the
1960s, coincided with the rapid rise of strict liability in tort for harm caused by
defects in commercially distributed products.15 Reflecting the reality that the
then-emerging rule of strict products liability applied primarily to harm caused
by manufacturing defects,16 the early tobacco claims were based on allegations
that cigarettes were inherently and unreasonably dangerous, breaching the
implied warranty of merchantability;17 that the tobacco company defendants
were negligent in failing to warn that cigarettes could cause cancer;1 8 or that the
companies had misrepresented cigarettes as safe. 19 Plaintiffs in these early
actions faced formidable obstacles. Even if general causation-that cigarettes
generically contribute to causing lung cancer and other respiratory illnesses-

13. See Robert L. Rabin, Institutionaland HistoricalPerspectives on Tobacco Tort Liability,
in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 110, 110-25 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., 1993); Rabin, supra note 3, at 855-76; Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave of
Tobacco Tort Litigation, in REGULATING TOBACCO 176, 176-97 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., 2001) [hereinafter Rabin, The Third Wave]; Robert L. Rabin, Tobacco Control
Strategies: Past Efficacy and Future Promise, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1721, 1732-44 (2008); Robert
L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation: A Tentative Assessment, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 332-47

(2001).
14. See Rabin, The Third Wave, supra note 13, at 176-79.
15. See Robert L. Rabin, Tort Law in Transition: Tracing the Patternsof Sociolegal Change,
23 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); Greenman
v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1962)).
16. See George L. Priest, Strict ProductsLiability: The OriginalIntent, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.

2301, 2303 (1989) (arguing that the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A intended
strict liability to apply to manufacturing defects only). But see Michael D. Green, The
Unappreciated Congruity of the Second and Third Torts Restatements on Design Defects, 74

BROOK. L. REV. 807, 836 (2009) (arguing that Section 402A applies not only to manufacturing
defects, but also to "easy cases in which products failed in performing at a minimal level of
safety").
17. See, e.g., Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 5-6 (8th Cir. 1964) (affirming a
verdict for the defendant in an implied warranty of merchantability claim where the jury was
instructed to find for the defendant if the defendant could not have foreseen the "harmful effects" of
smoking).
18. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 299 (3d Cir. 1961)
(discussing the plaintiffs argument that the defendant failed to warn that cigarettes contained
carcinogens).
19. See, e.g., Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 158 F. Supp. 22, 24 (D. Mass. 1957)
(analyzing the plaintiff's argument that the defendant misrepresented that cigarettes were safe).
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could be established,20 specific causation-that smoking had caused a particular
plaintiffs injuries-was difficult to prove. 21 And it was not clear that the
tobacco companies were negligent in the 1930s and 1940s in failing to discover
the dangers of smoking. Moreover, given that it was widely suspected in the
Second World War era that smoking was to some extent harmful,2 it seemed to
follow that plaintiffs who smoked did so knowingly and, in effect, had
themselves mostly (or entirely) to blame. 23
Two further factors, one theoretical and one practical, combined to make
tobacco claims in this first phase difficult to prosecute successfully. First, the
founders of the emerging strict products liability rule decided against deeming a
product defective based on inherent, unavoidable risks of injury, even if those
risks might be very great.24 The official comments to Section 402A of the
Restatement Second of Torts, promulgated in 1965, explicitly judged
unadulterated tobacco, along with butter and whiskey, nondefective when
properly marketed.25 And second, tobacco companies uniformly and steadfastly
refused even to consider settling any tort claims brought against them.2 6 This
"no settlement" stance meant that, to have any chance of recovery, every tobacco
claim had to go to trial and survive appellate review-an expensive, risky
proposition for plaintiffs' lawyers and their clients.27 Not surprisingly, relatively

20. Rabin, The Third Wave, supra note 13, at 197 (noting that tobacco defendants contested
the proof of the general causal link between smoking and tobacco-related diseases in the earlier era
of tobacco litigation, but now have abandoned this defense).
21. Id. Specific causation is still heavily litigated, requiring a plaintiff to procure a whole
litany of experts to support the claim that smoking caused that particular plaintiffs disease. Id.
22. See Rabin, supra note 3, at 855-56.

23. See id. at 863 (citing Pritchard,295 F.2d at 302 (Goodrich, J., concurring)).
24. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A cmt. i (1965); 38 A.L.I.
PROC. 87-88 (1961)).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965) provides:

Unreasonably dangerous. The rule stated in this Section applies only where the
defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer. Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption, and
any food or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only from over-consumption.
Ordinary sugar is a deadly poison to diabetics, and castor oil found use under Mussolini
as an instrument of torture. That is not what is meant by "unreasonably dangerous" in
this Section. The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics. Good whiskey is not unreasonably
dangerous merely because it will make some people drunk, and is especially dangerous to
alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a dangerous amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably
dangerous. Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of
smoking may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be
unreasonably dangerous. Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely because, if
such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks; but bad
butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably dangerous.
26. Rabin, supra note 3, at 857.
27. Id. at 858.
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few claims were filed in this first phase of tobacco litigation, and the tobacco
industry did not lose a single case. 28
Given the discouraging results of the first phase as viewed from a plaintiff's
perspective, twenty years would pass before the second phase of tobacco
litigation began in the late 1980s. 29 By that time, a growing cadre of plaintiffs'
trial lawyers had emerged.30 Doctrinally, a smattering of appellate decisions had
generated expectations that American courts might, after all, allow claims
asserting liability for inherent, unavoidable product-related risks 31 and for failing
to warn of risks about which the tobacco industry should have known had it
undertaken adequate testing regarding the carcinogenic properties of cigarettes. 3 2
Mounting evidence that nicotine was addictive seemed to offset the notion that
habitual smokers had only themselves to blame.33 And the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act,34 together with its related administrative hearings
and publicity, strongly reinforced the impressions, which developed from the
36
1964 Surgeon General's Report 35 and subsequent federal labeling legislation,

28. Id. at 859.
29. Id. at 854.
30. Id. at 866. Professor Rabin observed that in 1985, the Tobacco Products Liability
Project, headed by Professor Richard Daynard, began publishing "the Tobacco Products Liability
Reporter, held annual conferences, [and] established a communications network among tobacco
plaintiffs' lawyers." Id. at 866 n.80.
31. See, e.g., Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 115-16 (La. 1986)
(holding that if a product is "unreasonably dangerous per se," whether because of a design,
manufacturing, or other defect, the manufacturer can be held liable for resulting injuries despite its
lack of knowledge of the danger), superseded by statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56 (2009)
("A product is unreasonably dangerous in design if, at the time the product left its manufacturer's
control: (1) [t]here existed an alternative design for the product that was capable of preventing the
claimants damage. . . ."); Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1159 (Md. 1985) (holding that
a victim shot by a "Saturday Night Special" handgun could recover against the manufacturer even
though a gun is not unreasonably dangerous), superseded by statute, MD. CODE ANN., public safety
§ 5-402(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2003) ("A person is not strictly liable for damages for injuries to another
that result from the criminal use of a firearm by a third person."); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463
A.2d 298, 305 (N.J. 1983) (citing Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 451 A.2d 179, 184
(N.J. 1982) (imposing liability on the manufacturer of an above-ground swimming pool even
though no safer alternative design was available for the defective part), superseded by statute, N.J.
STAT ANN. §2A:58C-3 (a)(1) (West 2000) ("[A product is not defective in design if] there was not
a practical and technically feasible alternative design that would have prevented the harm without
substantially impairing the reasonably anticipated or intended function ofthe product. . . .").
32. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 300 (3d Cir. 1961) (finding that
there was sufficient proof to raise a jury issue as to whether the defendants should have known
about the risks attendant to smoking by undertaking additional tests as to the carcinogenic properties
of cigarettes); Cf Green v. Am. Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169, 170-71 (Fla. 1963) (holding that an
implied warranty of fitness imposes absolute liability for cigarettes that cause cancer even though
the manufacturer could not have known that users of the cigarettes would be in danger of
contracting cancer).
33. See Rabin, supra note 3, at 871.
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2006).
35.

U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., No. 1103, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY

COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964).

2010]

REACHING EQUILIBRIUM IN TOBACCO LITIGATION

73

that cigarettes really are quite dangerous. Consequently, the late 1980s showed a
significant increase in tobacco claims filed.37
Even more interesting than the reasons why this second phase of American
tobacco litigation began in the mid-to-late 1980s are the reasons for its fairly
rapid demise in the early 1990s. First, the earlier expectations that courts would
embrace strict liability for inherent, unavoidable product risks-what we have
termed "category liability" in other contexts 38 quickly dissipated in the same
jurisdictions that spawned them,39 and it became clear that tobacco companies
would be liable in tort only if the plaintiffs could show a failure to warn
consumers adequately of the hidden dangers presented by their products.4 0
Then, in 1992, the United States Supreme Court held that the federal labelinN
statutes preempted all post-1969 failure-to-warn tort claims based on state law.
The Court held that the statutes did not preempt fraud and express warranty
claims,42 but fraud and express warranty were difficult to establish in the early
1990s. 43 Given these developments, it became fairly obvious that tobacco claims
were very different from, and less attractive to plaintiffs' lawyers than, other

36. See, e.g., Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 4, 84 Stat.
87, 88 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (2006)) (requiring a warning label to "be
located in a conspicuous place on every cigarette package").
37. Professor Rabin's best estimate is that 175-200 cases were filed from 1983 to 1991. See
Rabin, supra 3, at 867 n.88.
38. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products
Liability Frontier: The Rejection ofLiability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1298-1300

(1991).
39. See supra note 31. Courts have also recently rejected category liability. See, e.g., Parish
v. Jumpking, Inc., 719 N.W.2d 540, 544-45 (Iowa 2006) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (1998)) (rejecting category liability for trampolines despite their inherent
dangers that cause injuries); Adamo v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 900 N.E.2d 966, 969
(N.Y. 2008) ("[P]laintiffs failed to show that light cigarettes are equivalent ... to regular ones ....
To hold, as plaintiffs ask, that every sale of regular cigarettes exposes the manufacturer to tort
liability would amount to a judicial ban on the product.").
40. It has long been the rule that a product seller has no duty to warn about open and obvious
dangers. See, e.g., Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23, 29-30 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
(holding that the manufacturer had no duty to warn that an elastic rubber exercise rope could
rebound and cause injury to users). The rule continues to the present day. See, e.g., Abney v.
Crosman Corp., 919 So. 2d 289, 295-96 (Ala. 2005) (holding that the manufacturer owed no duty to
warn because the risks of injury or death from an air gun are open and obvious); Roland v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 33 S.W.3d 468, 469-71 (Tex. App. 2000) (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears,
911 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Tex. 1995)) (holding that the manufacturer of a pickup truck had no duty to
warn that there were dangers associated with riding in an open truck bed); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB.

§2

cmt. j (1998) ("[A] product seller is not subject to liability for

failing to warn or instruct regarding risks ... that should be obvious to, . . . foreseeable product
users.").
41. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524, 530-31 (1992).
42. Id. at 526-27, 529-31; see also Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 546, 551 (2008)
(holding that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act does not preempt light cigarette
claims because plaintiffs can pursue common law fraud claims to determine whether the statements
are "inherently false" or merely create a misleading impression of greater safety).
43.

See Rabin, The Third Wave, supra note 13, at 178.
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mass tort claims.44 Given the tobacco industry's "no settlement" posture, 45 all
tobacco claims not withdrawn or dismissed went to trial. Companies'
willingness to go to trial reflected strong defenses based on awareness of risk
and absence of product defect; all trial verdicts were in defendants' favor.46
B.

The Third Phase (Mid-1990s to Present)

Three significant developments related to tobacco litigation combined in the
mid-1990s to spark a resurgence of activity by plaintiffs. The first, exogenous to
the tort system, involved the discovery and publication of highly embarrassing
and damaging documents obtained from tobacco company files during the course
of congressional hearings in the mid-1990s, allegedly showing fraudulent
suppression of facts regarding both the risks of tobacco use and the addictiveness
of nicotine.47 Because fraud claims are an exception to the Supreme Court's
ruling that failure-to-warn claims are preempted by federal law, 4 revelation of
the damaging industry secrets made claims of fraudulent marketing, with the
implications of possible punitive damages, more plausible. 49 And it became
easier for plaintiffs to argue that they did not have themselves to blame when, for
the first time, they could allege that the addictiveness of smoking made it
50
impossible for them to quit despite their desire to do so.
The second development that helps to explain the upsurge in tobacco
litigation in the mid-1990s-this one endogenous to the tort system-was
procedural rather than substantive. Judges and trial lawyers cooperated in the
1980s and 1990s to recognize and develop a number of claims-aggregation

44. See id.
45. Rabin, supra note 3, at 857-58.
46. Id. at 874 ("[A]fter thirty-five years of litigation, the tobacco industry could still maintain
the notable claim that it had not paid out a cent in tort awards.").
47. Rabin, The Third Wave, supra note 13, at 183-85 (recounting the revelation of internal
tobacco company documents to the press and to Congressman Henry Waxman's committee at
congressional hearings on tobacco, which triggered "a wave of revulsion against the industry in the
public and political spheres").
48. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524, 530-31 (1992).
49. Rabin, The Third Wave, supra note 13, at 185.
50. See, e.g., Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 884 F. Supp. 1515, 1525-26 (D. Kan.
1995) (rejecting the defendants' summary judgment argument that the risks of smoking were
common knowledge and noting that the defendants "purposefully manipulated their products to
increase" addictiveness); Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 557 N.E.2d 1045, 1055 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1990) ("[A] question of fact exists concerning the state of consumer expectations with
reference to the strict liability claim that [the d]efendants failed to warn of the addictive qualities of
their cigarettes .... A question of fact also remains concerning the allegations ... that the products
are defective because [the d]efendants failed to expeditiously explore design alternatives which
would make their products less addictive and whether that defect, if proven, rendered the products
more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would contemplate."). But see Chamberlain v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 70 F. Supp. 2d 788, 799 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (finding that the addictive nature of
cigarettes became a matter of common knowledge after the release of the 1988 Surgeon General's
Report).
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procedural approaches-such as class actions, consolidations, and multi-district
litigation-that were proving to be respectable and effective in other areas of
mass tort.51 Although some of these approaches arguably went so far as to
involve attempts to recognize amorphous new substantive grounds for recovery
that at least one critic argued was inherently unprincipled and unlawful, 52 by the
early 1990s procedural claims-aggregation techniques had become fairly
common and widely relied on. 53
The third development that helps to explain why plaintiffs filed a greater
number of tobacco claims in the mid-1990s than earlier is, like the second
development, endogenous to the tort system, but substantive rather than
procedural. Quite simply, resourceful plaintiffs' lawyers devised new legal
grounds for recovery that extended beyond the traditional claims based on
personal injury suffered by smokers. Plaintiffs continued to file personal injury
claims, but their litigation agendas broadened considerably. As data became
increasingly available regarding the effects of second-hand smoke on nonsmoking bystanders, plaintiffs began to bring claims-often as class actions-to
recover for the negative health effects of exposure to second-hand smoke.54
Plaintiffs also brouht actions to recover for pure economic losses allegedly
caused by smoking. Entities that claimed to have paid large sums to provide

51. See, e.g., In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098, 1101
(J.P.M.L. 1992) (transferring consolidated actions against the manufacturer to the Northern District
of Alabama); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 424 (J.P.M.L. 1991)
(transferring over 26,000 asbestos cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to Judge Charles R. Weiner in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania). For a discussion of a very early successful attempt to manage
mass tort litigation, see Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story--An Instance of Successful Mass

Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116, 121-41 (1968). Mass tort litigation received even
greater respectability when Judge Jack Weinstein certified a class of 2.4 million veterans claiming
to suffer injuries from exposure to "Agent Orange" during the Vietnam conflict. PETER H. SCHUCK,
AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 45, 124-26 (1986).

52.

James A. Henderson, Jr., The Lawlessness of Aggregative Torts, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV.

329, 337-41 (2005).
53. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 560-61 (E.D. La. 1995)
(certifying a class of cigarette smokers who were diagnosed by a physician as "nicotinedependant"), rev'd, 84 F.3d 734, 752 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying class certification because the
district court had abused its discretion by deciding that class questions predominated over individual
questions). Since the reversal of Castano, courts have unanimously refused class certification for
individual smoker claims. See infra note 72. Nonetheless, in the pre-Castano period, there was
good reason to believe that class certification might actually occur, which encouraged lawyers
representing tobacco claimants to file claims. See Rabin, The Third Wave, supra note 13, at 18083. Even after Castano,plaintiffs brought their class actions in state courts. See, e.g., Chamberlain,
70 F. Supp. 2d at 791 n.1.
54. See, e.g., Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(certifying a class action brought by thirty non-smoking flight attendants seeking damages from
inhaling second-hand smoke). In Broin, the litigants ultimately settled the case "four months into
trial" for $349 million. Brian H. Barr, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds: The ImproperAssessment ofPunitive
Damagesfor an Entire Class ofInjured Smokers, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 787, 805 (2001).

55. See, e.g., Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., 813 N.E.2d 476, 485-86, 492 (Mass. 2004)
(affirming certification of a class seeking economic damages for deceptive conduct in trade).
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medical care and treatments for injured smokers, including commercial insurers
and government health agencies, sought to recover from tobacco companies their
out-of-pocket expenditures on behalf of injured smokers.56 And perhaps most
imaginatively of all, plaintiffs brought class actions under the authority of
consumer protection statutes against a host of product sellers in a number of
states to recover monetary expenditures for so-called light cigarettes that the
tobacco industry allegedly fraudulently advertised as being safer than ordinary
cigarettes. 57
Combining these just-described circumstances-factual revelations of
industry misconduct,58 procedural claims-aggregation techniques, 59 and
innovative substantive theories of recovery -with the increasing specter of
huge punitive damages awards becoming commonplace,61 by the end of the
1990s and the early 2000s one might reasonably have predicted that tobacco
litigation had, at last, turned in plaintiffs' favor with a vengeance. The following
section explains why, ten years later, this Article can speak with confidence of
tobacco litigation reaching an essentially pro-industry equilibrium.
III. WHY THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS WILL WITNESS TOBACCO LITIGATION
REACH EQUILBRIUM

Consistent with the foregoing overview of the third phase of tobacco
litigation, the claims currently pending against the tobacco industry may be
grouped within five major categories: (1) claims by individuals for personal
62
injuries allegedly caused by tobacco use; (2) third-party payer claims by
insurers and government agencies based on payments of benefits to those
allegedly injured by tobacco use; 63 (3) class actions representing procedural
aggregations of individual personal injury claims;64 (4) class actions to recover
economic losses incurred by consumers who purchased light cigarettes; 6 5 and (5)
class actions to recover the costs of medical monitoring and smoking cessation
programs. 66 We will first consider two of these categories that, on any fair
assessment, are no longer viable and will play no significant role in future
litigation. We will then consider three categories that have some life remaining,

56. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
57. See cases cited infra note 160.
58. See supranote 47 and accompanying text.
59. See supranotes 51-53 and accompanying text.
60. See supranotes 55-57 and accompanying text.
61. See Clifford E. Douglas, Ronald M. Davis & John K. Beasley, Epidemiology of the Third
Wave of Tobacco Litigation in the United States, 1994-2005, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL (Supp. 4) iv9,
ivl2 tbl.2 (2006).
62. See infra Part III.B.1.
63. See infra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
65. See infra Part III.B.2.
66. See infra Part II.B.3.
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but only in the shorter run or as part of an eventual equilibrium of predictable,
non-industry-threatening plaintiffs' recoveries.
A.

Categories of Tobacco Litigation that Are No Longer Viable: ThirdParty Payor Claims and Class Actions Based on Individual Personal
Injuries

Third-party payor claims brought by insurance companies and other nongovernmental entities are a dead issue. A variety of state and federal courts have
dismissed virtually every such claim on grounds of remoteness. 67 By contrast,

67. See, e.g., Perry v. Am. Tobacco Co., 324 F.3d 845, 849 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming the
dismissal of claims by individual subscribers of health insurance, who sought to represent a
putative class of subscribers seeking reimbursement of higher premiums, based on other circuit
court decisions that "such claims must fail because the alleged injuries are too remote"); Serv.
Emps. Int'l Union Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 249 F.3d 1068, 1070-71, 1076
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that the injuries alleged by the Republic of Guatemala for health care costs
it incurred when treating its citizens' smoking-related illnesses were "too remote, contingent,
derivative, and indirect to survive" (quoting In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litig.,
83 F. Supp. 2d 125, 130 (D.D.C. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lyons v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 225 F.3d 909, 911, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal of antitrust and RICO claims
brought by trustees of multi-employer health plans as too indirect); United Food & Commercial
Workers Union, Emp'rs Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 223 F.3d 1271, 1272-75
(11th Cir. 2000) ("[A] health-care provider has no direct cause of action in tort against one who
injures the provider's beneficiary, imposing increased costs upon the provider."); Tex. Carpenters
Health Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 199 F.3d 788, 789-90 (5th Cir. 2000) (dismissing, on
grounds of remoteness, an action brought by union trust funds seeking to recover costs incurred by
treating tobacco-related illnesses); Local 734 Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
196 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 1999) ("The injury for which the plaintiffs seek compensation is remote
indeed, the chain of causation long, [and] the risk of double recovery palpable because smokers can
file their own ... suits .... ); Or. Laborers-Emp'rs Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 185 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming the dismissal of a benefit plans' claim for
tobacco-related medical expenses as too remote); Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 244 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[T]he economic injuries alleged in[the]
plaintiffs' complaint are purely derivative of the physical injuries suffered by plan participants and
therefore too remote as a matter of law for them to have standing to sue defendants."); Steamfitters
Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 921 (3d Cir. 1999) ("[T]he
key problem with [the] plaintiffs' complaint is the remoteness of their alleged injury from the
defendants' alleged wrongdoing. Remoteness is an aspect of the proximate cause analysis, in that
an injury that is too remote from its casual agent fails to satisfy tort law's proximate cause
requirement....").
Only three health-care cost recoupment suits have survived pre-trial motions. See Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), rev'd sub
nom. Empire Healthchoice, Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 393 F.3d 312 (2d Cir. 2004); City of St.
Louis v. Am. Tobacco Co., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (E.D. Mo. 1999); Iron Workers Local Union No.
17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 582 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
Courts have also ruled that damages are too speculative. See, e.g., LaborersLocal 17 Health
& Benefit Fund, 191 F.3d at 239-40 ("[T]he damage claims [in recoupment actions] are incredibly
speculative. It will be virtually impossible for plaintiffs to prove with any certainty: (1) the effect
any smoking cessation programs or incentives would have had on the number of smokers among the
plan beneficiaries; (2) the countereffect that the tobacco companies' direct fraud would have had on
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third-party payor claims brought by various states to recoup healthcare benefits
provided to citizens injured by tobacco use have fared better. Indeed, the
tobacco industry settled all of these state claims in 1998 for more than two
hundred billion dollars in a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA). 68 The terms
of the MSA are complex and include modifications of industry behavior over
time;69 the important point here is that the MSA presumably shuts off any
serious litigation of this sort by the states in the future.
The Department of
Justice brought a somewhat analogous action in federal district court against the
tobacco industry under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) statute, seeking a variety of injunctive remedies as well as
disgorgement of past profits derived from the fraudulent marketing of tobacco
products. 72 In an interlocutory appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that plaintiffs may

the smokers, despite the best efforts of the Funds; and (3) other reasons why individual smokers
would continue smoking, even after having been informed of the dangers of smoking and having
been offered smoking cessation programs.").
Additionally, courts have noted that allowing plaintiffs to recover in these types of cases
would be inequitable.

See, e.g., Local 734 Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 196 F.3d at 823-24

("Everyone dies eventually, usually after illness. An insurer must cover these costs even if the
cause is natural. To determine damages, therefore, it is essential to compare the costs the insurers
actually incurred against the costs they would have incurred had cigarettes been safer. Is death from
lung cancer at age 60 more costly to an insurer than the same person's death from a different kind of
cancer later in life? The longer an insured lives in good health, the more reserves an insurer
accumulates to cover eventual illness; it is necessary to consider both the income and the
expenditure sides of the insurer's balance sheet. The income side of the balance sheet includes
higher premiums paid by smokers (or employers on smokers' behalf). Having collected extra
money from the smokers ... to cover the eventual illness, an insurer can't turn around and collect
from the tobacco manufacturer for the same outlay.").
68.

See

Master

Settlement

Agreement,

NAT'L

ASS'N

OF

ATTORNEYS

GEN.,

http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-pdf/ [hereinafter MSA]. The cigarette
industry settled with Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota for a total of $36.8 billion in
1997.

W. Kip Viscusi & Joni Hersch, Tobacco Regulation Through Litigation: The Master

Settlement Agreement 8 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15422, 2009),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl5422.pdf?new window-I. The remaining 46 states
settled with the cigarette industry with the Master Settlement Agreement for a total of $206
billion in 1998. Id. at 8-9.
The Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) represents a rare and notable exception to the
industry's "no settlement" stance. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. This instance, and the
industry's settlement of a class action involving second-hand smoke claims, see supra sources cited
note 54, represent the only instances where the tobacco industry was willing to settle rather than go
to trial. Had the states taken their claim for medical reimbursement to trial, the case would have
been the subject of considerable legal debate. Although the reasons for the settlement by the
tobacco industry are beyond the scope of this paper, some scholars view the MSA essentially as a
privately-agreed-upon excise tax between the states and the tobacco companies. See Viscusi &
Hersch, supra, at 68.
69. See MSA, supranote 68, at 18-36.
70. See id. at 110-20.
71. 18U.S.C.§§1961-1968(2006).
72. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 72, 73-74 (D.D.C. 2004)
(citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006)), rev'd,396 F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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not recover money damages based on disgorgement of profits under RICO. 73 On
remand, the federal district court granted a variety of equitable and injunctive
remedies, 74 accompanied by an opinion excoriating the tobacco industry for its
past behavior. On June 28, 2010, the United States Supreme Court denied the
certiorari petition of both parties, 76 thus putting to rest the issue of whether the
federal government will recover money damages from the tobacco industry in
the future.
Regarding class actions based on individual tobacco-related personal injuries
over the past decade, American courts have rejected class actions in tort
generally.
In most cases, the inherent individuality of personal injury tort
claims-the elements of defendant's breach, damages, and specific causation,
including reliance in fraud actions-are not sufficiently common to members of
the proposed class to support class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Even if some state courts might be willing to apply
their own class action rules more favorably to plaintiffs, a relatively recent
federal statute-the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) 79-allows defendants to

73. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
74. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 919-45 (D.D.C. 2006), affd
in partand vacated in part, 566 F.3d 1095, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
75. Id. at 852-86.

76. Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3501 (2010); United States v. Philip
Morris USA, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3501 (2010).
77. The leading case rejecting class certification of cigarette litigation is Castanov. American
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). Many federal and state courts followed suit. See, e.g.,
Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
176 F.R.D. 479, 500 (E.D. Pa. 1997)) (holding that the issues specific to individuals-nicotine
addiction, causation, the need for medical monitoring, contributory and comparative negligence,
and the statute of limitations-precluded class certification); Estate of Mahoney v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 204 F.R.D. 150, 154-55 (S.D. Iowa 2001) ("[T]he differences among the plaintiffs
and the proposed class members are not merely factual differences regarding the circumstances of
how their claims initiated[;] they impact the very legal theories on which the class can proceed."
(quoting Guillory v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 97 C 8641, 2001 WL 290603, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20,
2001) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Badillo v. Am. Tobacco Co., 202 F.R.D. 261, 264-65
(D. Nev. 2001) (denying motion for class certification because the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation requirements); Philip Morris, Inc. v.
Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200, 205 (Md. 2000) (vacating class certification order); Small v. Lorillard
Tobacco Co., 679 N.Y.S.2d 593, 598-601 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding class certification was
not appropriate because individual issues predominated, and because the typicality and adequacy of
representation requirements were not met), aff'd, 720 N.E.2d 892, 894 (N.Y. 1999); see also Engle
v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1258, 1267-71 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam) ("We conclude that
continued class action treatment for Phase III of the trial plan is not feasible because individualized
issues such as legal causation, comparative fault, and damages predominate."). For a discussion of
the impact of Engle on class members whose claims were before the trial court in Phase I of the
litigation, see infra text accompanying notes 131-51.
78. See cases cited supra note 77.
79. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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remove large class actions from state court to federal court,so where, under Rule
23, federal judges will presumably refuse to certify.81 The tobacco industry's
recent success rate in getting class actions decertified based on individual
personal injuries82 supports our prediction that these class actions will play no
significant role in future tobacco litigation.
B. Categories of Tobacco Claims that Retain Some Vitality: Individual
(Non-Class) Personal Injury Claims, Light Cigarettes Claims, and
Claims for Medical Monitoring and Smoking Cessation Programs
1. Individual (Non-Class)PersonalInjury Claims

Regarding individual personal injury claims, were it not for a significant
cluster of cases (numbering in the thousands) remaining to be tried in Florida
courts in the aftermath of an aborted class action,83 and a smaller cluster of cases
consolidated in West Virginia,84 we would unhesitatingly predict that individual
claims will not play an important role in future tobacco litigation. We will return
to consider the Florida cases in a moment. 85 Putting them to one side,
defendants have won close to half of tobacco claims that were tried to verdict

80. The Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) vests the federal courts with original jurisdiction
over any civil action with over 100 claimants when the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million
and the action is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006). CAFA abolishes
the complete diversity rule for class actions and eliminates the need to determine whether the
individuals have met the jurisdictional amount of $75,000. Id. Thus, when such actions are
commenced in state courts, any one of the defendants can remove the action to federal court based
on CAFA. 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2006). For a full airing of the issues raised by CAFA, see Edward F.
Sherman, Class Actions After the ClassAction FairnessAct of 2005, 80 TuL. L. REV. 1593 (2006);
Georgene M. Vairo, Foreward:Developments in the Law: The Class Action FairnessAct of 2005,

39 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 979 (2006).
81. See cases cited infra note 159.
82. See cases cited supra note 77.
83. See infra notes 130-60 and accompanying text.
84. See Altria Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 18-19 (Feb. 24, 2010) (revealing that
there are 711 civil actions in West Virginia that are proposed to be tried in a single proceeding). In
its opinion In re Tobacco Litigation, 624 S.E.2d 738 (W. Va. 2005), the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia upheld a trial plan that would allow a Phase I trial on liability and a Phase II trial
on punitive damages in which the trial court would apply a multiplier for punitive damages. Id. at
743-44. The authors are highly skeptical that punitive damages can be set before individual
compensatory damages are assessed. Our reading of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.

v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), would not allow a finding of punitive damages without a prior
finding of compensatory damages for a plaintiff. Our opinion is bolstered by the subsequent
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346
(2007), where the Court emphasized that while the reasonableness of punitive damages can be
considered in the context of the potential harm the defendant could have caused, the potential harm
must be "harm potentially caused the plaintiff" Id. at 1063. For a more in-depth discussion of
these Supreme Court cases, see infra notes 123-37 and accompanying text.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 130-60.
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between 1994 and 2005.86 Undoubtedly reflecting these trends in outcome,
filings of individual claims over the same period have trended steadily
downward. Why has the pursuit of individual personal injury claims against
tobacco companies become relatively unattractive to plaintiffs and their lawyers
in recent years? Part of the answer regarding filings surely resides in the "no
settlement" posture that the industry continues to adopt in such cases.88 A
tobacco plaintiff considering whether to file suit understands that, before she will
recover, she will have to face a plethora of factual and legal issues that may
legitimately negate her cause of action. She will have to face such issues as
whether she saw or heard representations of the tobacco companies, whether she
learned of the risks attendant to smoking from her physician or others, whether
she made any attempt to stop smoking, and whether the injury she suffered
stemmed from tobacco use or came about from sources other than tobacco. The
individual facts predominate and provide good reason for the tobacco companies
to litigate the claims individually rather than in class actions. Furthermore, lay
juries cannot be counted on to return verdicts for plaintiffs. Many of the tobacco
company victories result from jury skepticism about rewarding plaintiffs who
knew of the dangers of smoking. Many of these issues provide fertile ground
for appeal in the event of a plaintiff victory at the trial level. Going to court is no
guarantee for success and certainly not for an expedited victory.
The apparent success of this tactic does not rest on an inherent scarcity of
resources available to lawyers who prosecute major tort claims on behalf of

86. In cases brought against Philip Morris, by far the largest makers of cigarettes, plaintiffs
won 31 of the 75 cases (4 1%) that were tried to verdict in this time period. See Douglas et al., supra
note 61, at iv11.
87. In 1997, there were 375 individual smoking cases pending against Philip Morris. Id. at
ivl 1 tbl.1. In 2005, if one excludes the 2,640 cases brought by flight attendants for compensatory
damages arising from inhaling second-hand smoke, only 223 individual cases were pending against
Philip Morris. Id. As of February 2010, if one excludes the previously mentioned flight attendant
cases, the Florida cases following the decertification of the Engle case, and 8 individual cases
brought against retailers that are indemnitees of Philip Morris, Altria reports 88 individual cases
pending against it in its most recent Form 10-K. See Altria Grp., Inc., Annual Report, supra note
84, at 18-19.
88. See Rabin, supranote 3, at 857-58. For a view that maintaining a non-settlement posture
by defendants in mass tort pharmaceutical claims raises moral and ethical issues, see Frank M.
McClellan, The Vioxx Litigation:A CriticalLook at Trial Tactics, the Tort System, and the Roles of

Lawyers in Mass Tort Litigation, 57 DEPAUL L. REv. 509, 530-34 (2008). McClellan advocates
several substantial changes to the rules and procedures for the litigation of mass torts. Id. at 534-37
(suggesting policymakers change the rules applicable to class action litigation, aggressively impose
a duty of good faith and fair dealing on the litigants, or enact a statute awarding treble damages to a
plaintiff when the defendant "fails to make a good-faith effort to settle a tort case in a timely
manner"). We disagree with his thesis. Mass torts should not negate fundamental principles of tort
litigation. See Henderson,supra note 52, at 329-30.
89.

See Marc Z. Edell, CigaretteLitigation: The Second Wave, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 90, 97-

98 (1986) (stating that knowledge of the health risks of smoking has existed since the 1920s).
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injured plaintiffs.90 Rather, it rests on the common-sense notion that, given the
relatively low probability of eventual success on the merits, it is simply not
worth the unavoidabli high costs, in most instances, of seeking recovery against
tobacco companies.
One source of countervailing encouragement in this
regard is the possibility of punitive damages, a subject discussed below. 92
What explains the relatively pro-defendant responses from judges and juries
in recent years in cases that reach trial? An important factor must be that the
typical plaintiff began and continued using tobacco after it was widely
understood that such use is extremely hazardous; 93 tobacco defendants argue that
plaintiffs are responsible for assuming the risk of injuries. 9 4 Moreover, the
negative effects of the publicity regarding tobacco company misbehaviors, which
shocked the public when revealed in the mid-1990s, appear to be fading with the
passage of time. Tobacco products lawfully remain on the market, and their
continued use, notwithstanding the highly restrictive behavioral regulations
making it increasingly difficult for tobacco users to continue their habits, 95 is
increasingly seen to be a matter of personal choice and individual
responsibility.96 Moreover, many tobacco plaintiffs have difficulty causally
connecting their injuries with tobacco use,97 and the ailments from which they
suffer are not uniquely associated with exposure to tobacco. 98

90. Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A Morality Play's Third Act: Revisiting Addiction, Fraud and
Consumer Choice in "Third Wave" Tobacco Litigation, 46 U. KAN. L. REv. 465, 472 (1998)

(discussing how sixty plaintiffs' law firms funded the costs of litigating Castano by each providing
$100,000 per year).
91. See Rabin supra note 3, at 859-60 (discussing methods designed to drive up the cost of
litigation that defense attorneys used during the second wave).
92. See infra notes 113-32 and accompanying text.
93. See Cupp, supra note 90, at 493-94 ("[T]he typical smoker has ... received a plethora of
warnings .... ).
94. In almost every case tried to verdict in the post-Engle litigation in Florida, juries assessed
a significant percentage of fault to plaintiffs, thus reducing their awards for compensatory damages.
See infra Appendix A. As time marches on, recovery will be considerably more difficult for
plaintiffs since juries are likely to be cynical about claims that plaintiffs were misled into smoking.
This is likely to be especially true for claims brought by plaintiffs who began smoking after the
Surgeon General's Report in 1964 and after the appearance of warnings on cigarette packages.
95. See generally Peter D. Jacobson & Lisa M. Zapawa, Clean Indoor Air Restrictions:
Progress and Promise, in REGULATING TOBACCO, supra note 13, at 207, 215-26 (discussing

federal and state clean indoor air laws banning smoking in specified locations).
96. Editorial, Smoking as Personal Choice, WASH. POST, July 29, 1994, at A24; Callsfor
Personal Responsibility in Healthcare Reform Debate, JoiN TOGETHER (Aug. 11, 2009),

http://www.jointogether.org/news/headlines/inthenews/2009/calls-for-personal.html;

Editorial,

Smoking Ban: StrongArguments on all Sides, THE VOLANTE (Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.volanteon

line.com/opinion/editorial-smoking-ban-strong-arguments-on-all-sides-1.1315083.
97.

See Donald G. Gifford, PublicNuisance as a Mass ProductsLiability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L.

REv. 743,757 (2003).
98.

See Rabin, Tobacco Control Strategies: Past Efficacy and Future Promise, supra note

13, at 1743-44 (discussing that although there is a general concession by the tobacco companies of
causation, there is still much room to argue that the specific plaintiffs injury was not attributed to
use of their products). Professor Rabin notes that "[t]he etiology of tobacco-related disease
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In trying to understand why individual personal injury claims do not appear
to hold out much promise to plaintiffs, it is helpful to compare tobacco litigation
with other mass tort litigation, such as litigation based on exposure to asbestos.
In contrast to tobacco, government regulatory agencies have banned many uses
of asbestos due to its dangerous nature.99 Asbestos users have spent, and are
spending, huge sums on its containment and removal. 100 Moreover, asbestos
plaintiffs, in contrast to tobacco plaintiffs, present themselves as innocent
victims who had little or no choice regarding exposure to unseen carcinogens. 101
And specific causation is easier for asbestos plaintiffs to prove; exposure to
asbestos causes signature diseases such as mesothelioma and asbestosis. 102
Taken together, the foregoing substantive characteristics comprise what
might be termed the asbestos litigation model of mass tort, which is significantly
different from the tobacco litigation model. But the most significant feature of
the asbestos model is procedural, not substantive;103 unlike the tobacco
companies, the defendants in asbestos litigation are willing to settle with

frequently requires the testimony of a pathologist, a pharmacologist, an oncologist, an
epidemiologist, an addiction specialist, and public health experts." Id. at 1744.
99. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
(1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2006)). In 1989, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) sought "to prohibit ... the future manufacture, importation, processing,
and distribution in commerce of asbestos in almost all products." Asbestos; Manufacture,
Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce Prohibitions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460 (July 12,
1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 763). However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals set aside
the EPA ban. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 947 F.2d 1201, 1229-30 (5th Cir.
1991). On May 18, 1999, the EPA issued a document entitled, "EPA Asbestos Materials Bans:
Clarification," which indicated the kinds of products in which asbestos is banned by regulating
agencies.

ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, EPA ASBESTOS MATERIALS BANS: CLARIFICATION (1999).

It

also acknowledged that the "EPA does NOT track the manufacture, processing, or distribution in
commerce of asbestos-containing products. It would be prudent for a consumer or other buyer to
inquire as to the presence of asbestos in particular products." Id.
100. Estimates are that in the decade preceding 1999, between $3 billion and $4 billion were
spent on asbestos removal each year. Dennis Cauchon, When Removing Asbestos Makes No Sense,
USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 1999, at 1A. One consultant estimated that expenditures on asbestos removal
would equal $100 billion. Id. The allocation of such vast sums on asbestos abatement has been
sharply criticized as wasteful. Id. The chief epidemiologist for the American Cancer Society,
Michael Thune, has proclaimed that "[t]he risk of getting cancer from asbestos in buildings is so
small that eliminating it wouldn't create a measurable blip in the (171,000) lung cancer deaths that
occur every year." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. See, e.g., John Crane, Inc. v. Wommack, 489 S.E.2d 527, 529 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)
(affirming verdict for the plaintiff, who argued at trial that the defendant was negligent in failing to
warn of the hazards of asbestos); Hammond v. N. Am. Asbestos Corp., 454 N.E.2d 210, 218-19
(Ill. 1983) (affirming jury award of compensatory damages to wife of asbestos worker in loss of
consortium claim).
102. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION 12-14 (2005).

103. See generally Michelle J. White, Asbestos Litigation:ProceduralInnovations and Forum
Shopping, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 365, 372-76 (2006) (discussing new procedural aspects in asbestos
litigation).
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claimants, typically employing a bureaucratic, en masse approach.104 Thus, a
plaintiffs' lawyer in the asbestos context typically retains a number of clients
who can plausibly link their injuries with prior exposures, 1o files tort actions on
their behalf, and counts on compensation eventually coming out of a settlement
fund, without the costs of court trials. 106 Many other mass tort areas have
replicated this basic model, including Dalkon Shields,107 Vioxx,1os Shiley heart
valves,109 and breast implants.
The important point in the context of a
discussion of tobacco litigation is that the asbestos litigation model is not
relevant to the bringing and processing of tobacco claims." The asbestos model
treats tort claims on a wholesale basis as commodities to be bought and sold in
bulk in specially contrived markets designed to lower transaction costs. 112 By
contrast, the tobacco model approaches tort claims on a strictly retail basis by

104. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 102, at 129 ("In asbestos litigation, individualized

process is a myth. Most cases are settled, many according to standardized agreements negotiated by
defendants and plaintiff attorneys[,] to apply to what attorneys conventionally refer to as their
'inventories' of cases. Under such agreements, all cases against some defendants may be settled for
a flat fee, while cases against other defendants will be sorted into a 'matrix' of claims, according to
a few distinguishing characteristics, and paid the values associated with the different matrix cells.
Bankruptcy personal injury trusts, which absent congressional action will pay an increasing share of
asbestos compensation in the future, institutionalize this administrative compensation process for
asbestos claims."); Alan Calnan & Byron G. Stier, Perspectives on Asbestos Litigation: Overview
and Preview, 37 Sw. U. L. REv. 459, 464-65 (2008); Helen E. Freedman, Selected Ethical Issues in

Asbestos Litigation,37 Sw. U. L. REv. 511, 517 (2008) (citing Paul F. Rothstein, What Courts Can
Do in the Face of the Never-EndingAsbestos Crisis, 71 Miss. L. J. 1, 14-20 (2001)).
105. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 102, at 23-24 ("By 1985, ten firms represented onequarter of the annual filings against major defendants. By 1992-about [twenty] years after the
landmark Borel decision-just ten firms represented half of the annual filings against major
defendants. Three years later, ten firms ... represented three-quarters of the annual filings against
asbestos defendants, even though the filings themselves had increased by a third.").
106. See supranote 104.

107. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 42 F.3d 870, 871 (4th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (affirming the
July 1, 1991 administrative order, entered by the district and bankruptcy courts, which set forth the
structure of payment for the claims); In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 710-20 (4th Cir. 1989)
(affirming the District Court's approval of $2.475 billion settlement for all unliquidated claims),
abrogatedby Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997).
108. Vioxx Settlement Agreement 1-2, http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents
/Maste/o20Settlement%/o20Agreement%/o2 O-%/o20new.pdf (resolving Vioxx claims "involving heart
attacks, ischemic strokes, and sudden cardiac deaths" for $4.85 billion through a "pre-funded and
structured private settlement program"). The parties signed the settlement agreement on November
9, 2007. Id. at 1.
109. See Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 148, 170 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (approving
settlement agreement that "offer[ed] benefits to class members and their spouses from funds totaling
$165 to $215 million").
110. Lindsey v. Dow Coming Corp. (In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.),
No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1994 WL 578353, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (enforcing
$4,225,070,000 settlement agreement for injuries arising from silicone breast implants).
111. See Rabin, The Third Wave, supra note 13, at 203 (indicating that, unlike asbestos
litigation, the tobacco industry avoided settling at virtually any cost from the outset).
112. See generally CARROLL ET AL., supra note 102, at 32-33 (showing the "wholesale"
nature of asbestos claims by discussing the regularity of claim consolidation).
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treating each claim as an action to be litigated on its individual merits. Given the
significant differences between these two models of litigation, it is not difficult
to understand why plaintiffs' lawyers would prefer to devote their limited time
and resources to pursuing individual tort claims relating to nontobacco products
under the asbestos model, rather than bringing actions against the tobacco
industry.
It remains to consider two countervailing factors which, in combination,
may cause individual plaintiffs' tobacco claims to retain sufficient attractiveness
to give them life over the near to intermediate term: first, the possibility that
individual tobacco plaintiffs, when successful, will obtain awards of punitive
damages sufficiently great to compensate for the low probability of winning a
judgment in the first place; and second, the possibility that the individual claims
being litigated in Florida, which may present a large but limited group of
plaintiffs with a brighter prospect over the short term, can be replicated over the
long term in other jurisdictions. Regarding punitive damages, it is common
knowledge that the United States Supreme Court has undertaken to review the
reasonableness of state court punitive damages awards by employing a federal
due process analysis.113 Although the majority opinion in the leading case, State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,114 hints that a single-digit
ratio between punitive damages and compensatory damages may constitute an
outside limit on punitives, 15 the Supreme Court has yet to hold that the singledigit ratio applies to a punitive damages award where the plaintiff has suffered a
personal injury. The leading tobacco decision regarding punitive damages,
Phillip Morris USA v. Williams,116 involved a roughly one hundred-to-one ratio
between punitives and compensatories; 117 lawyers widely anticipated that the
case would provide a platform for the Supreme Court to clarify the rules
governing federal limits on the size of punitive damage awards in personal injury
cases.118 Instead, the Court reversed the state court award for the plaintiff on the
ground that the trial court impermissibly allowed the jury to punish the defendant
tobacco company for injuries that the company had inflicted in other states on

113. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 435 (2001)
(citing and quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 n.10 (1998)) (requiring appellate
courts to apply a de novo standard when reviewing a lower court's determination of the
constitutionality of a punitive damages award); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 56567, 574-75 (1996) (refusing to sustain a $2 million punitive damages award when the jury awarded
the plaintiff only $4,000 in compensatory damages).
114. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
115. Id. at 424-425.
116. 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
117. Id. at 351.
118. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Weigh Limits on Punitive Damages, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,
2006, at A17. In Williams, the Supreme Court originally granted certiorari to consider whether the
Oregon Supreme Court "disregarded 'the constitutional requirement that punitive damages be
reasonably related to the plaintiffs harm."' Williams, 549 U.S. at 352 (citing Petition for a Writ of
Certiori at I, Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (No. 05-1256), 2006 WL 849860). However, the Court did not
reach the issue of the applicability of the single-digit ratio to personal injury claims. Id.
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other victims. 119 On remand, the state high court affirmed the judgment for the
plaintiff on independent state law grounds, 120 and the Supreme Court refused to
grant further review.121
Whether the Supreme Court will allow trial courts to impose substantial,
high-ratio punitive awards in favor of tobacco plaintiffs suffering personal injury
is not clear. On the one hand, the four dissenting Justices in Williams voted to
uphold a punitives award based on nearly a one hundred-to-one ratio. 122it
would take only one more vote to establish the principle that, at least in personal
injury cases involving allegedly egregious conduct, the ratio-based approach
considered in State Farm does not apply. 12 3 On the other hand, the Williams
restrictions on the conduct for which plaintiffs may ask juries to punish
defendants may dampen plaintiffs' future attempts to inflame the passions of
juries by arguing that tobacco companies deserve to pay hugely for all the harm
that can be attributed to use of tobacco.124 Moreover, the Supreme Court has yet
to address an issue that has for decades been recognized as troublesome: the
unfairness of punishing a defendant multiple times in a succession of tort actions

119. Id. at 353-55.

120. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 176 P.3d 1255, 1263 (Or. 2008).
121. The Supreme Court initially granted certiorari on a limited basis to review the Oregon
Supreme Court decision. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 2904 (2008). However,
the Court later dismissed the grant of certiorari as improvidently granted. Philip Morris USA Inc. v.
Williams, 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009).
122. Williams, 549 U.S. at 358, 361-362 (Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
123. See id. Some of the justices who voted with the majority in Williams might well take the
position that the State Farm single-digit ratios should not apply to personal injury cases. See id. at
353 (listing the ratio as only one factor to consider in determining punitive damages excessiveness).
The addition of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan to the Court may provide additional votes against the
use of the single-digit ratios in personal injury claims. Greg Stohr, Sotomayor on High Court May
Mean Looser Limits on Damage Awards, BLOOMBERG (June 5, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/

apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=ay2 LzqaXiQY.
124. But see Williams, 549 U.S. at 357. Justice Stevens's dissent argued that there is little
likelihood that juries will be less affected by an instruction that they may not punish non-parties.
Justice Stevens stated:
While apparently recognizing the novelty of its holding, the majority relies on a
distinction between taking third-party harm into account in order to assess the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct-which is permitted-and doing so in order
to punish the defendant "directly"--which is forbidden. This nuance eludes me. When a
jury increases a punitive damages award because injuries to third parties enhanced the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the jury is by definition punishing the
defendant-directly-for third-party harm. A murderer who kills his victim by throwing
a bomb that injures dozens of bystanders should be punished more severely than one who
harms no one other than his intended victim. Similarly, there is no reason why the
measure of the appropriate punishment for engaging in a campaign of deceit in
distributing a poisonous and addictive substance to thousands of cigarette smokers
statewide should not include consideration of the harm to those "bystanders" as well as
the harm to the individual plaintiff. The Court endorses a contrary conclusion without
providing us with any reasoned justification.
Id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
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by different plaintiffs for the same egregious conduct.125 Assuming that when
the Court finally addresses this issue of successive, redundant punishment, it will
attempt to place constitutional restrictions on multiple punishments, such
restrictions will further limit the power of state courts to allow huge punitive
damages awards.126 On balance, we believe that all of these considerations
reduce significantly the extent to which the expectations of recovering massive
punitive damages awards will cause plaintiffs to pursue individual personal
injury tobacco claims in the future. After all, those same expectations of
recovery were in place in the recent time period when filings of tobacco claims
steadily declined; 27 the Supreme Court's continuing concerns over punitive
damages awards will serve only to reduce, not to increase, those expectations.

125. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838-41 (2d Cir. 1967)
(expressing concern about the problem of "claims for punitive damages on the part of hundreds of
plaintiffs"); Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as
Punishmentfor Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 587 (2003) ("This practice of

punishing the defendant ... has led countless judges and commentators to worry about the potential
for excessive multiple punishment: the possibility that several victims will obtain punitive damages
awards that were each designed to punish the entire wrongful scheme, resulting in unjustly high
cumulative punishment."); Jim Gash, Solving the Multiple Punishments Problem: A Callfor a
National Punitive Damages Registry, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1613, 1618-44 (2005) (giving an

exhaustive review of both scholarly and judicial discussion of the multiple punitive issue); David G.
Owen,A PunitiveDamages Overview: Functions,Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 406

(1994) ("Surely the most momentous question as yet unresolved by the Court is whether the
Constitution imposes any restraints on the repetitive imposition of punitive damages in mass
disaster litigation, such as the litigation that has confronted the asbestos industry for many years.").
The United States Supreme Court has yet to grapple with the issue of multiple punitives even
though Justice Kennedy alluded to the problem when writing for the majority in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell. 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003) (discussing the question of

punishing the defendant for conduct toward non-parties and concluding that "punishment on these
bases creates the possibility of multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct. . . .").
126. Many courts have struggled with the issue of whether multiple punitive damages awards
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment, or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Dunn v.
HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1385-86 (3d Cir.) ("[M]ultiple punitive damages awards are not inconsistent
with the due process clause or substantive tort law principles . . . ."), modified on reh'g, 13 F.3d 58,
62 (3d Cir. 1993); Sch. Dist. of Lancaster v. Lake Asbestos of Que (In re Sch. Asbestos Litig.), 789
F.2d 996, 1004 (3d Cir. 1986) ("Unlimited multiple punishment for the same act determined in a
succession of individual lawsuits and bearing no relation to the defendants' culpability or the actual
injuries suffered by victims, would violate the sense of fundamental fairness that is essential to
constitutional due process." (quoting In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1188 (8th Cir.
1982) (Heaney, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading
Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1059-64 (D.N.J.) ("[A]ctions for punitive damages are not sufficiently
'criminal' in nature to require the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment"), vacated on reh'g, 718 F. Supp. 1233, 1236 (D.N.J. 1989); In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("There must, therefore, be some limit,
either as a matter of policy or as a matter of due process, to the amount of times defendants may be
punished for a single transaction.").
127. See, e.g., Douglas et al., supra note 61, at ivI (comparing 375 individual pending
tobacco cases against Philip Morris in 1997 with only 223 in 2005, not excluding the 2,640 cases
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Finally, if awards of multiple punitive damages were to become sufficiently
serious as to threaten the profitability of the tobacco industry, one could expect
that states would join the tobacco industry in arguing that such awards are
unconstitutional.
The monies from the $206 billion Master Settlement
Agreement that are to be distributed to the states over a twenty-five year
period1 2 8 are of vital importance to cash-strapped state governments. 129 They
simply cannot afford to see that stream of income disappear. It would be
difficult for the United States Supreme Court to ignore this reality in favor of
huge punitive damages awards that would inure to the benefit of individual
plaintiffs and their lawyers.
The second source that may give tobacco plaintiffs hope for the future is the
current success that plaintiffs have enjoyed in going to trial recently in Florida
courts. 13 0 The leading decision is Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc.131 In that case,
the trial court certified a class composed of Florida smokers who claimed
resultant personal injuries. 132 The case proceeded through two phases of a multiphase trial plan, 13 3 resulting in plaintiffs' special verdicts on broadly-framed
issues of defectiveness, addiction, and general causation.134 The intermediate
court of appeals thereafter decertified the class 135 and the Florida Supreme Court
affirmed decertification prospectively,136 allowing the special jury verdicts
already entered against the defendants to stand on the basis of collateral
estoppel.137 The court allowed Engle class members one year in which to refile

brought by flight attendants); Altria Grp., Inc., Annual Report, supra note 84, at 18 (reporting only
88 pending individual tobacco cases against Philip Morris in February 2010).
128. See MSA, supranote 68.
129. See Nicholas Confessore, Larger Cash Shortfall is Projected in Albany as Fiscal Year

NearsEnd, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2010, at A29 (reporting that New York is considering refinancing
its share of the proceeds from the Master Settlement Agreement, which may bring in between $500
million to $1.5 billion in funds to help bridge the budget gap); Dan Simmons, State Siphons
Tobacco-Settlement Funds, CH.

BREAKING

NEWS

CENTER

(Jan.

28,

2010,

11:03

PM), http://www.chicagobreakingnews.com/2010/01/state-siphons-tobacco-settlement-finds.html;
George F. Will, Editorial, The States' Tobacco Addiction, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2006, at B7 ("Under
the MSA, the states are scheduled to get their portions of the pot over many years. But deferral of
gratification is un-American, so some states, eager to get their loot, have 'securitized' their expected
portions. Securitization involves selling bonds backed by the anticipated revenue."); Allison Young,
Cigarette Taxes are Gold Rush for States: Increases Help Fill Budget Shortfalls, U.S.A. TODAY,

March 26, 2010, at Al.
130. See infra Appendix A.
131. 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam).
132. Id. at 1256.
133. Id. at 1256-57.
134. Id. at 1276-77. The trial court made findings as to general causation, addiction of
cigarettes, strict liability, fraud by concealment, civil-conspiracy concealment, breach of implied
warranty, breach of express warranty, and negligence. Id.
135. Liggett Grp., Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434, 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
136. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1277.
137. Id. at 1269 ("The pragmatic solution is to now decertify the class, retaining the jury's
Phase I findings other than those on the fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress
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their claims individually in order to take advantage of the favorable special jury
verdicts.138 Subsequently, at least 8,000 plaintiffs met this deadline. 13 A federal
district court recognized that giving the broadly-framed jur verdicts in Engle
preclusive collateral effect would constitute manifest error.
According to the
court, issue preclusion is proper only when the previous issue is identical to the
issue presented in the current litigation.141 The issues decided in the Engle class
action were general and open-ended-e.g., "Did one or more of the Defendant
Tobacco Companies [ever] place cigarettes on the market that were defective and
unreasonably dangerous [in any way]?" 142 The district court concluded that, in
the nonaggregative context of post-Engle actions by individual plaintiffs, such a
"general, non-specific finding of tortious conduct on the part of one or more
[d]efendants [did] not satisfy the requirements of issue preclusion .... 143 On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the burden was on the plaintiffs to
demonstrate that the findings of the jury were sufficiently specific to be binding
on the parties, and it remanded the case to the district court to make the
appropriate determination.144 The court of appeals noted that it found nothing in
the record to support the assertions of the plaintiffs that sufficient specificity was
present in the trial record or in the jury findings.145 Nonetheless, it remanded the
issue to the district court for closer examination.146 If, in the likely event that the
heavy burden imposed by the Eleventh Circuit cannot be met, it would appear
that much of the post-Engle litigation will have to be retried. 147
How might one explain the pro-plaintiff outcomes in the post-Engle
litigation in Florida? For starters, these cases may represent a randomly
distributed cluster that just happened to occur early. On this view, post-Engle

claims .... Class members can choose to initiate individual damages actions and the Phase I
common core findings we approved ... will have res judicata effect in those trials.").
138. Id at 1277.
139. See Brief of Appellees at 11, Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324 (11th
Cir. 2010) (No. 08-16158), 2009 WL 2816556. But see Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 576
F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1334 & n.Il (M.D. Fla. 2008) (noting that "approximately 4,000 former Engle
class members filed suit" in state court and that "[d]efendants ... removed virtually all of [the] state
court actions" to federal court (emphasis added)), vacated,611 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2010).
140. Id at 1346.
141. Id at 1340 (quoting Goodman v. Aldrich & Ramsey Enters., 804 So. 2d 544, 546-47
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) ("[F]or issue preclusion to apply, . . . an identical issue must have been
presented in the prior proceeding. . .
142. Id at 1341-42.
143. Id at 1348 ("[T]he Engle plaintiffs as a whole allege [that] different acts and omissions
by different [d]efendants, [ultimately] breached different tort duties[,] to different people[,] at
different times[,] causing different injuries.").
144. Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 08-16158, 2010 WL 2866923, at *9-10 (11th
Cir. July 22, 2010).
145. Id. at *9.
146. Id. at *10.
147. The potential of clash between the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the Florida
Supreme Court as to the constitutionality of cases tried pursuant to the Engle remand is real. Should
such a conflict eventuate, it is likely that the United States Supreme Court would resolve the issue.
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plaintiffs should succeed, over time, at no greater overall rate than do individual
tobacco plaintiffs generally. If this should prove true, one can expect that the
number of post-Engle claims taken to trial will trend downward over time. Or
perhaps the sample from which these early post-Engle cases arise is not
randomly selected-the plaintiffs' lawyers may deliberately be sending stronger
cases to trial early with the hope that they will set a tone for subsequently
litigated cases148 or cause the tobacco companies to change their traditional "no
settlement" posture.149 On the reasonable assumption that the defendants do not
change their posture, one can expect that post-Engle litigation will return to
traditional patterns of outcomes, with plaintiffs taking fewer claims to trial and
getting verdicts affirmed on appeal in only a small percentage of litigated cases.
Of course, the possibility exists that the special verdicts being given
preclusive effect in Engle are making the claims less costly to litigate150 and are
responsible for the more favorable plaintiff verdicts.
If that is the case,
eventual reversal of the collateral estoppel ruling in Engle will overturn these
plaintiffs' verdicts and prevent their recurrence thereafter. 15 2 Should such a

148. In reviewing the thirteen Engle progeny cases that have gone to verdict in Florida, we
note that all but one involved plaintiffs who began smoking pre-1965 when warnings were
mandated by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2006).
See infra Appendix A. Thus, the argument that the plaintiffs made a knowledgeable choice and
took into account the health risks of smoking is somewhat diminished. Also note that in many cases
the verdict is significantly reduced by plaintiff fault. Id. One can reasonably expect that in cases
when the plaintiffs began smoking before 1965, the juries will assign a lesser percentage of fault to
the plaintiffs. Of the thirteen cases discussed in Appendix A, ten juries found for the plaintiff, two
found for the defendant, and one case settled for $1,000. Id. As we were going to press we learned
that twenty-eight post-Engle cases have been litigated. See Engle Verdict Tracker Updated,
COURTROOM VIEW NETWORK (Oct. 26, 2010, 11:33 AM), http://info.courtroomview.com/Blog/bid

/48811/Engle-Verdict-Tracker-Updated. Plaintiffs have been victorious in twenty and defendants
have won eight. Id. It is interesting to note that tobacco defendants have won the last five cases.
Id.

149. See supranote 26 and accompanying text.
150. The plaintiffs are spared the lengthy presentation of witnesses and documents that span a
fifty year period. The authors' discussions with attorneys substantiate that six-to-eight week trials
have now been compressed to approximately two weeks. The only issues to be litigated are specific
causation and plaintiff fault. See Engle v. Ligget Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1254 (Fla. 2006).
This keeps the costs down. Defendant fault and general causation were determined in the Phase I
litigation; juries are instructed that liability on those issues is to be assumed. Id. at 1277. Thus, the
plaintiffs are spared the lengthy and costly presentation of witnesses and documents that can span a
fifty-year period.
151. See infra Appendix A. One might have presumed that the issues of defendant fault and
general causation would go against the defendants in the non-abbreviated trials, leaving only issues
of specific causation and plaintiff fault as grounds for a defense verdict. It appears, however, that
trial court instruction on all of the Phase I holdings has had a strong effect on juries. See infra
Appendix A. In a full blown trial, contrary expert testimony on issues such as addiction and a
historical overview of the tobacco industry conduct may actually soften the attitudes of juries in
some cases.
152. We predict that the post-Engle Florida cases will be reversed because they violate
fundamental res judicata principles and constitutional due process norms. See supra discussion in
text accompanying notes 140-47. Furthermore, even if these cases legitimately go to trial and final
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reversal occur, relatively few post-Engle plaintiffs will end up winning in
Florida, at no greater rate than tobacco plaintiffs have won traditionally. Even if
the collateral estoppel ruling in Engle should not be overturned and the ruling
exerts an important pro-plaintiff influence on outcomes, the odds of a similar set
of circumstances recurring in another jurisdiction are quite remote. 153 After all,
Engle was a misconceived class action that the trial court separated into phases
for trial and that the appellate court properly decertified while attempting to give
future effect to earlier, fragmentary jury findings. It follows that the post-Engle
litigation in Florida does not change our assessment that individual personal
injury claims against the tobacco industry are transitioning into an equilibrium in
which tobacco plaintiffs win only relatively rarely. Plaintiffs may do better in
Florida over the short term, but that string will end when outcomes revert
naturally to their normal patterns; when Engle's collateral estoppel ruling is
overturned on appeal; or when the several thousands of these unusuallypositioned cases finally work their way through the trial and appellate processes.
In our view, Engle and its progeny represent a unique phenomenon that does not
alter our longer-term assessment of tobacco litigation.
2.

The Light CigarettesLitigation

Light cigarettes litigation is comprised of statewide class actions brought
under various state consumer fraud statutes on behalf of smokers who purchased
light cigarettes within a designated time frame. 154 The claimants have not yet

verdict, there are not likely to be more than forty to sixty trials per year. Neither Florida nor West
Virginia will clog their calendars exclusively with tobacco litigation. For example, as of February
19, 2010, fifty-six Engle progeny cases had been set for trial in 2010. Altria Grp., Inc., Annual
Report, supra note 84, at 19. We predict that tobacco defendants will win many of these cases.
Comparative fault will likely reduce victorious plaintiffs' awards. See infra Appendix A. Thus, net
losses to the tobacco companies will be spread over many years.
153. See Altria Grp., Inc., Annual Report, supra note 84, at 18 (reporting only eighty-eight
individual tobacco cases nationwide aside from cases in West Virginia and Florida). Plaintiffs'
attorneys do not appear eager to bring large numbers of tobacco cases. See id. Florida and West
Virginia appear to be the only states where there is significant litigation. See id. In both states,
courts have allowed for trials in separate phases, trying liability separate and apart from specific
causation. See Engle v. Ligget Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1257-57 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam); In re
Tobacco Litig., 624 S.E.2d 738 740 (W. Va. 2005). Moreover, in Florida, the court found that
continued class certification was not feasible. See Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1267-68. The court
permitted the bifurcated litigation only because the previous litigation was the law of the case. See
id. at 1266-69.
154. See, e.g., Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 541 (2008) (claiming that Philip
Morris USA, Inc. and Altria Group, Inc. violated state law by "intentionally deceiv[ing the
plaintiffs] about the true and harmful nature of 'light' cigarettes") (citing Maine Unfair Trade
Practices Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 207 (Supp. 2009)); Holmes v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,
No. 03C-08-167 JTV, 2009 WL 5193043, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 4, 2009) (claiming that "the
defendant violated the [Delaware Consumer Fraud Act] by deliberately deceiving consumers about
the true and harmful nature of 'light' and 'lowered tar and nicotine' cigarettes) (citing the Delaware
Consumer Fraud Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2513 (2005 & Supp. 2008)); Aspinall v. Philip
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suffered physical injuries as a result of smoking, or at least they do not claim
such injuries.155 Instead, they seek to recover for the economic losses they
allegedly incurred when they paid money for cigarettes that the tobacco
companies fraudulently advertised as being safer than ordinary cigarettes. 156
Given that hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of smokers in each state fall
within these light cigarettes consumer classes 15 7 and that each smoker may have
spent considerable sums on light cigarettes,158 the liabilities these actions impose
could be quite substantial. Judicial reactions to light cigarettes claims have
varied. Since these cases are viable only as class actions, the major issue is
whether courts will certify them. Most courts have refused to do so under Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1 59 or the state equivalents of Rule
23.160 Consistent with our earlier discussion of class
actions generally,161 federal
16 2
courts have been especially hard on these claims.

Morris Cos., Inc., 813 N.E.2d 476, 479-80 (Mass. 2004) (seeking damages for "deceptive conduct
in a trade or business" for "the marketing of Marlboro lights as 'light' cigarettes that deliver
'lowered tar and nicotine"') (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93a, §§ 2, 9 (2004)).
155. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Good v. Altria Grp., fic, 436 F. Supp. 2d 132 (2006)
(No. 1:05CV00127), 2005 WL 2179239; Complaint, Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 98-6002H
(1998), 1998 WL 34190483.
156. See sources cited supra note 155.
157. See Aspinall, 813 N.E.2d at 485 (estimating the number of plaintiffs in Massachusetts in
the "hundreds of thousands").
158. For a list of average retail prices for a pack of cigarettes per state, see State Excise and
Sales Taxes PerPack of Cigarettes,CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, http://www.tobaccofree

kids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0202.pdf (last visited October 5, 2010).
159. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 234 (2d Cir. 2008)
(decertifying class because there were "numerous issues not susceptible to generalized proof' and
claim did not meet the Rule 23 predominance requirement); Benedict v. Altria Grp., Inc., 241
F.R.D. 668, 680-81 (D. Kan. 2007) ("[T]he individual inquiry required ... renders a class action on
[these] claims unmanageable."); Mulford v. Altria Grp., Inc., 242 F.R.D. 615, 626-27, 630 (D.N.M.
2007) (denying the class certification because "individualized questions relat[ing] to causation, loss,
and the affirmative defenses overwhelm the common issues raised by [d]efendants' conduct").
160. See, e.g., Cocca v. Philip Morris Inc., No. CV 1999-008532, 2001 WL 34090200, at *1
(Ariz. Super. Ct. July 24, 2001) ("Although there are significant common questions of law and fact
concerning liability, questions that vary from class member to class member are predominant as to
liability and overwhelmingly predominant as to damages."); Philip Morris USA Inc., v. Hines, 883
So. 2d 292, 294-95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) ("We find that the trial court erred in certifying this
lawsuit as a class action .... Despite a common nucleus of facts concerning a prospective classaction-defendant's conduct, a lawsuit may present individualized plaintiff-related issues which
make it unsuitable for class certification."); Stem v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. MID-L-2584-03,
2007 WL 4841057 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 16, 2007) (decertifying action brought under
state law because individual "issues related to causation, loss and affirmative defenses"
predominated); Pearson v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 0211-11819, 2006 WL 663004, at *1 (Or. Cir.
Ct. Feb. 23, 2006) (denying motion to certify because individual issues predominated); Davies v.
Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc., No. 04-2-08174-2 SEA, 2006 WL 1600067, at *4-5 (Wash. Super. Ct.
May 26, 2006) (denying motion to certify because Rule 23 requirements of typicality, commonality,
predominance, and superiority were not satisfied).
161. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
162. Id.
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To be sure, some state courts have certified the relevant classes and ruled
that the claims are appropriate under the relevant statutes.163 Although these
actions may prove costly to the tobacco industry in the short term, any future
light cigarettes actions brought in state courts will be removed under CAFA to
federal court,164 where they will almost certainly be dismissed. Thus, in a
fashion similar to the post-Engle individual actions in Florida, the light cigarettes
class actions pending in a dozen or so states do not alter our view that the next
ten to twenty years will witness a steady transition to an equilibrium in tobacco
litigation.
3.

Medical Monitoring and Smoking Cessation Class Actions

In recent years, smokers who have not yet manifested symptoms of physical
injury have brought class actions to recover funds to establish programs to
medically monitor smokers and to help them to quit smoking.165 A majority of

163. See, e.g., Holmes v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 03C-08-167 JTV, 2009 WL 5193043
(Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 4, 2009) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment and holding that
Delaware state law covered fraudulent conduct in marketing light cigarettes); Aspinall v. Philip
Morris Cos., Inc., 813 N.E.2d 476, 479-80 (Mass. 2004) (certifying class under state law); Craft v.
Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 190 S.W.3d 368, 374, 384 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (certifying class under state
law and noting that the issue of whether individual reliance destroys commonality was a matter to
be determined since the statute did not clarify whether reliance was required).
164. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. On September 10, 2009, light cigarette
cases pending in federal district courts in California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Maine, New York,
and Texas were transferred, under MDL No. 2068, to the United States District Court for the
District of Maine under Chief Judge John A. Woodcock, Jr. In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. and Sales
Practices Litig., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2009). At least nine other light cigarette cases are
pending transfer to the same court. Id. at 1380 n.2. In an important development on March 5, 2010,
Judge Woodcock denied the plaintiffs motion for collateral estoppel, In re Light Cigarettes Mktg.
and Sales Practices Litig., 691 F. Supp. 2d 239, 242 (D. Me. 2010) (quoting United States v. Philip
Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 28 (D.D.C. 2006), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 566 F.3d
1095, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2009)), which was based on Judge Gladys Kessler's finding in United States
v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., that the tobacco companies had engaged in widespread fraud in
marketing light cigarettes, id. It should be noted that class certification has yet to be decided in all
the MDL No. 2068 cases. Despite these developments, the tobacco companies have said that they
will vigorously defend these cases. See Altria Grp., Inc., Annual Report, supra note 84, at 17.
Furthermore, the tobacco companies will likely defend the charges of fraud on the grounds that they
have worked with "members of the public health community to develop a less hazardous cigarette."
See K. Michael Cummings et al., Consumer Acceptable Risk: How Cigarette Companies have
Responded to Accusations that their Productsare Defective, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL (Supp. 4) iv84,

iv85-86, 87 tbl.2. Whether this defense will effectively blunt the fraud allegations remains to be
seen.
165. See, e.g., Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 131 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[P]laintiffs
ask[] ... that defendants fund a court-supervised or court approved program providing medical
monitoring to class members .... ); Badillo v. Am. Tobacco Co., 202 F.R.D. 261, 262 (D. Nev.
2001) ("[P]laintiffs request medical monitoring in order to detect if they have any diseases as a
result of their exposure to cigarette smoke."); Guillory v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 97 C 8641, 2001
WL 290603, at *1 (N.D. Ill. March 20, 2001) ("[P]laintiffs seek to establish a cessation program
and a court supervised medical monitoring program to be funded by defendants . . . ."); Thompson
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courts that have considered these or analogous claims have rejected them,
holding either that they do not satisfy the requisites for class certificationl66 or
that, in the absence of a showing of personal injury, tort claims to recover such
costs will not lie.167 But a significant minority of courts have allowed such
claims,168 and it could be argued that a trend is underway in that direction.169
Notwithstanding that these claims can be very costly to tobacco company

v. Am. Tobacco Co., 189 F.R.D. 544, 547 (D. Minn. 1999) ("Plaintiffs seek ... the establishment of
a smoking cessation program and a court-administered medical monitoring program . . . ."); Emig v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 184 F.R.D. 379, 383-84 (D. Kan. 1998) ("[P]laintiffs seek ... medical
monitoring[] and implementation of smoking cessation programs...."); Lowe v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc., 183 P.3d 181, 182-83 (Or. 2008) ("[Plaintiff seeks] injunctive relief requiring the
'creation of a court-monitored program of medical monitoring, smoking cessation and education ,
for her and approximately 400,00 similarly situated oregonians.").
166. See, e.g., Barnes, 161 F.3d at 149 (refusing to grant certification because of plaintiffs'
individual issues); Badillo, 202 F.R.D. at 265 (same); Guillory, 2001 WL 290603, at *9 (same);
Thompson, 189 F.R.D. at 557 (same); Emig, 184 F.R.D. at 395 (same).
167. See, e.g., Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1997)
(holding that the plaintiff, who had not manifested symptoms of disease, was not entitled to recover
medical monitoring costs); Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 829-32 (Ala. 2001) ("Alabama
law has long required a manifest, present injury before a plaintiff may recover in tort."); Wood v.
Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 859 (Ky. 2002) (requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate "present
physical injury" before obtaining remedy of medical monitoring); Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701
N.W.2d 684, 686, 701 (Mich. 2005) (holding that the plaintiffs, who had no present injury, did not
present a viable tort claim for medical monitoring costs); Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc.,
949 So. 2d 1, 9 (Miss. 2007) (holding that Mississippi does not recognize a medical monitoring
cause of action without present injury); Badillo v. Am. Brands Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 441 (Nev. 2001)
("Nevada common law does not recognize a cause of action for medical monitoring."); Lowe, 183
P.3d at 187 ("[N]egligent conduct that results only in a significantly increased risk of future injury
that requires medical monitoring does not give rise to a claim for negligence.").
168. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990) (predicting
that Pennsylvania would recognize a cause of action for medical monitoring if the plaintiff was at
increased risk of disease); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 800 (Cal. 1993)
(holding that medical monitoring costs are recoverable in a negligence action); Petito v. A.H.
Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103, 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that Florida recognizes a
medical monitoring cause of action despite the absence of "identifiable physical injuries or
symptoms"); Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 914 N.E.2d 891, 898 (Mass. 2009) (answering a
certified question that Massachusetts law recognizes a claim for medical monitoring based on
subclinical effects of exposure to cigarette smoke); Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 31213 (N.J. 1987) (holding that "the cost of medical surveillance is a compensable item of damages"
notwithstanding the absence of present symptoms of physical injury); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel
Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979-81 (Utah 1993) (holding that medical monitoring costs may be
recovered regardless of the existence of current injury or illness); Bower v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 430-31 (W. Va. 1999) (recognizing a cause of action for medical monitoring
costs where a plaintiff proves that "such expenses are necessary and reasonably certain to be
incurred").
169. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad:
Exposure-BasedRecovery for IncreasedRisk, Mental Distress, andMedical Monitoring,53 S.C. L.
REv. 815, 836-49 (2002). We suggest that case law is trending toward acceptance of the medical
monitoring cause of action and note several courts' recent rejections of that cause of action. Id. at
838-41.
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defendants, we do not view them as sufficiently significant to alter our overall
assessment of tobacco litigation. Only a few jurisdictions will end up
recognizing judgments establishing monitoring and cessation programs. There is
no realistic chance for them to assume the proportions of a mass tort.
IV. CONCLUSION

The approaching equilibrium in tobacco litigation will rest on two basic
foundations: first, the distinction between what we have termed the asbestos
model of personal injury litigation and the tobacco model; and second, the longheld sense among Americans that injuries from tobacco use reflect the personal
choices of users and are largely self-inflicted. Regarding the two models of
litigation, in connection with the asbestos model, claims are commodified and
traded en masse in special markets created via settlement agreements. In
connection with the tobacco model, each claim remains individualized and is
resolved only after exhaustion of the judicial process. These differences rest, in
turn, on the differences between tobacco and all other dangerous products that
have been, and continue to be, the focus of mass tort litigation based on the
asbestos model. The most crucial difference may be that tobacco products are
not legally defective merely because they possess the inherent, unavoidable
capacity to injure those who use them precisely as intended. Other products
share this quality-alcohol, for example.171 But alcohol is presumably benign
(even beneficial) when consumed in moderation.172 And the social experiment
involving federal prohibition of the sale of alcoholic beverages is viewed today
as an ill-advised failure. 1 73
As this Article has explained, over the previous sixty years of tobacco
litigation, courts have resolved a number of important, but nevertheless
peripheral, issues. Neither the states nor the federal government appear to have
any significant future claims against the tobacco companies for the economic

170. See infra Appendix A (outling significant damages that plaintiffs received in ten Florida
cases).
171. Alcohol is subject to federally mandated warnings under the Alcoholic Beverage
Labeling Act of 1988. See 27 U.S.C. § 215 (2006). Unlike tobacco, however, courts have roundly
rejected claims of failure-to-warn about the dangers of alcohol consumption. See, e.g., Maguire v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d 565, 569-70 (Iowa 1986) (holding there is no duty to warn of the
dangers of drinking beers prior to driving an automobile); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v.
McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. 1991) (finding no duty to warn of the dangers of developing
alcoholism from "excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages"); Brown Forman Corp. v. Brune,
893 S.W.2d 640, 648 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that there is no duty to warn of dangers of
rapidly consuming a large quantity of tequila).
172. Alcohol Use: If You Drink, Keep It Moderate, MAYO CLINIC (Aug. 21, 2010),

http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/alcohol/SC00024.
173. See generally Mark Thornton, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 157: Alcohol

Prohibition Was a Failure, CATO INST. (July 17, 1991), http://www.cato.org/pub display.
php?pub id=1017.
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costs of caring for injured smokers under programs of public health.17 Class
actions based on tobacco-related personal injuries are generally not available to
plaintiffs."' Individual actions based on post-1969 failure-to-warn allegations
are federally preempted.176 Controls on the awarding of runaway punitive
damages are an ongoing project in the Supreme Court.177 And consumer
protection class actions to recover purely economic losses, as with the light
But the central truth is
cigarettes class actions, are riddled with difficulties.
the important issue: given the industry's "no settlement" posture and the high
costs of litigation, individual personal injury tobacco claims are simply not worth
bringing.
Of course, if juries were ready to reward tobacco plaintiffs often and
generously, the equation might tip in the opposite direction. Why are American
juries skeptical of tobacco users' claims? We are persuaded that the answer
largely lies in the growing sentiment that adults who choose to smoke, given the
widely understood risks of doing so, are responsible for their own actions. To be
sure, there still remain some smokers who started smoking long enough ago to
claim relative innocence. But their numbers, like the numbers of World War II
veterans,179 are dwindling year by year. Those who began smoking more
recently face not only their own complicity, but also the much more responsible
behaviors of tobacco companies in recent years.
Two possible future developments might undermine our prediction of a proindustry equilibrium: First, American courts might recognize new legal bases of
recovery, possibly for unconventional elements of loss, that might revitalize
tobacco litigation in this country. Second, personal injury tobacco litigation
might commence and flourish in jurisdictions abroad. Regarding the possibility
that new theories of recovery may revitalize American tobacco litigation, we
deem it unlikely in the extreme that such new theories will emerge. Plaintiffs
have made a number of attempts in this regard and have failed, including
bringing actions extending and distorting the doctrine of public nuisance180 and

174. See supranotes 67-76 and accompanying text.
175. See supranote 77 and accompanying text.
176. See supranote 41 and accompanying text.
177. See supranotes 113-27 and accompanying text.
178. See cases cited supra Part III.B.2. But even where class certification is granted, the
problem of realistically assessing damage is a daunting one. How much safer were light cigarettes
supposed to be? How does one measure the differential between light and regular cigarettes? In
McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co., 522 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 2008), the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals examined two models for assessing damages and found them wanting. Id. at 228-30.
While its findings are only binding in a federal RICO action, the problems of damage assessment
will also haunt plaintiffs in non-RICO actions.
179. Eight hundred fifty World War II veterans pass away per day. Nat'l Ctr. for Veterans
Analysis and Statistics, VA Stats At a Glance, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF. (July 30, 2010),

http://wwwl.va.gov/VETDATA/Pocket-Card/4X6_summerlO sharepoint.pdf.
180. See, e.g., Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 610, 619-20
(W.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that under Pennsylvania law, health care providers failed to state a claim
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claims to recover for mental and emotional distress in the absence of personal
This does not mean that no new theory is possible; proving such a
injury.
negative is, itself, impossible. But on the reasonable assumption that American
courts will continue to refuse to impose strict category liability on the tobacco
industry merely because its products are inherently and unavoidably unsafe, 182
and assuming no factual disclosures of the sort that occurred in the 1990S,183
pursuing tort claims under the tobacco litigation model will never be sufficiently
attractive to plaintiffs' lawyers to support prolonged mass tort attacks upon the
tobacco industry.
What of the possibility that tobacco litigation will become sufficiently
attractive abroad to support significant streams of tort claims against American
tobacco companies? We and others have written elsewhere regarding the
substantive and procedural differences that make tort claimsIenerally more
difficult to prosecute in foreign courts than in American courts.
Interestingly,
the substantive law of foreign jurisdictions may be more inclined, at least
theoretically, to favor individual personal injury plaintiffs-the European
Directive governing products liability in Europe, for example, recognizes
category liability, at least in principle. 8 5 At the same time, however, it is
unlikely that foreign jurisdictions would replicate the class actions that plaintiffs
have pursued in some American states. In foreign courts, the future prospects
for tobacco plaintiffs will ultimately turn, as they will in this country, on the
likelihood of success in classic individual personal injury actions. In that

for public nuisance absent a showing that their alleged harm was different from the harm suffered
by other members of the general public).
181. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 845-47 (2000) (citing numerous cases on the

availability of emotional distress claims for plaintiffs exposed to toxins).
182. See, e.g., Little v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 480, 491-94
(D.S.C. 2001) (holding that a question of fact existed regarding whether the defendants' cigarettes
were unreasonably dangerous); Neri v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 98-CV-371, 2000 WL
33911224, at * 11-15, 22 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2000) (granting summary judgment for the defendant
on the plaintiffs strict liability design defect claim); Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., 731 F. Supp. 50,
52-53 (D. Mass. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover on the grounds that
cigarettes are unreasonably dangerous), aff'd, 926 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated, 112 S. Ct.
3019 (1992); Gianitsis v. Am. Brands, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853, 856-59 (D.N.H. 1988) (holding that
strict products liability was not cognizable under New Hampshire law as applied to cigarette
products).
183. See supranotes 47-50 and accompanying text.
184. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, What Europe, Japan, and Other
Countries Can Learn from the New American Restatement of ProductsLiability, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J.
1, 12-20 (1999); Gary T. Schwartz, Product Liability and Medical Malpractice in Comparative
Context, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION

28, 63-76 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) (noting that foreign legal systems do not
allow liberal discovery and contingent fees for attorneys, impose "loser pays" attorney fee
sanctions, and provide for much lower damage awards).
185. See Council Directive 85/374/EEC, art. 6, 1985 O.J. (L 210). The directive provides for
a rather open-ended consumer expectations test for defective products. See id. Pushed to its
extreme, it might be possible to encompass category liability within this framework.
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context, foreign plaintiffs may face an obstacle American claimants do not: in
many foreign countries, far more draconian warnings and more extensive
regulations have traditionally accompanied the sale and distribution of tobacco
products. 186
In the final analysis, an answer to the question of whether tort claims against
American tobacco companies will ever prosper in foreign courts turns on many
factors, some of which are cultural. On balance, we do not believe that
individual tobacco plaintiffs will do any better abroad than they have done here,
and we have good reasons to believe they will do worse. Warnings in many
foreign countries are more pronounced than those Congress mandates. Tobacco
companies are certain to refuse to settle such claims, and with "loser pays
transaction costs" rules in place,
bringing tobacco actions will be seen as
unattractive gambles. Also, in the majority of foreign jurisdictions, damage
awards are far more modest than in the United States and less likely to entice
plaintiffs to engage in protracted litigation.188
Now let us return to our predictions regarding the future of American
tobacco litigation. If we are correct in our assessments, then it follows that we
are headed toward an equilibrium. In the short term-say, the next five to ten
years-some plaintiffs may enjoy impressive victories in post-Engle cases in
Florida and light cigarettes litigation in a handful of state courts. But by its
seventy-fifth anniversary in 2030, tobacco litigation will be a relatively small but
steady stream of personal injury claims sponsored mainly by risk-preferring
plaintiffs' attorneys in the hope of winning the punitive damages lottery.
Attempts to introduce new theories and bases of recovery will no doubt
punctuate this litigation at intervals, but all will fail. Nonjudicial regulations
regarding the distribution, marketing, and consumption of tobacco products will
continue to play a significant role in this country's efforts to balance the
demands of tobacco users with public health concerns. 189 But judicial regulation

186. In Brazil, illustrations on cigarette packages include depictions of various body parts
affected by cancer, one fetus aborted, and one man with his leg amputated. See Picture Based
Cigarette Warnings: Brazilian Cigarette Warnings, PHYSICIANS FOR A SMOKE-FREE CANADA,

http://www.smoke-free.ca/warnings/brazilo2O-%o20warnings.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2010). In
India, health warnings include the phrases "[t]obacco kills 2500 Indians every day" and "[y]our
smoking kills babies."
Picture Based Cigarette Warnings: India's Cigarette Warnings,
PHYSICIANS FOR A SMOKE-FREE CANADA, http://www.smoke-free.ca/warnings/India-warnings.htm

(last visited Oct. 5, 2010). In Jordan, the law requires an image of a diseased lung to be printed on
cigarette packages. Picture Based Cigarette Warnings: Jordan's Cigarette Warnings, PHYSICIANS

FOR A SMOKE-FREE CANADA, http://www.smoke-free.ca/warnings/Jordan-warnings.htm (last
visited Oct. 5, 2010). For a review of the multitude of graphic warnings in foreign countries, see
Picture Based Cigarette Warnings, PHYSICIANS FOR A SMOKE-FREE CANADA, http://www.smoke-

free.ca/warnings/default.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
187. See Schwartz, supra note 184, at 66-70.
188. See id. at 70-76.
189. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat.
1776 (2009) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387a-1 (2009); Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States,
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through tobacco litigation will play no significant role. Final equilibrium, at
levels that do not threaten the survival of the tobacco industry, will have been
reached.

678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 519, 541 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (upholding all but two provisions of the Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act against constitutional challenges).
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